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 A B S T R A C T  
This study aimed to examine the effect of auditor tenure in artificial rotation on audit 
quality. Tenure shows the relationship between the audit firms and a client that is
measured in years. Artificial rotation of auditor (audit firm) indicates a condition that,
conceptually, there has been a change of auditors leading to the auditor relationship 
with the client to be disconnected, whereas substantive auditor-client relationship is 
ongoing. Formally, the auditor does not violate the rules and is still able to audit for
the same client. Yet, in the long-term, it could affect the audit quality. The longer 
auditor tenure, the closer auditor-client relationship is. Thus, the auditor accommo-
dates the interests of the client at the client's financial statements, including the prac-
tice of discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. The samples were selected by 
purposive sampling method of the companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from
the year 2002-2010, with multiple linear regression approach. It shows that tenure,
and total assets do not affect the quality of the audit while the size of the audit firm, 
and debt statistically have significant effect on audit quality. Future studies may ex-
tend the period of observation, and using other audit quality measures, such as fraud,
and the propensity of auditor to issue going concern opinion..  
 
  A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh tenur auditor dalam rotasi artifisial
pada kualitas audit. Tenur menunjukkan hubungan antara KAP dengan klien yang
diukur dalam tahun. Rotasi artifisial auditor (KAP) menunjukkan suatu kondisi 
bahwa secara konseptual telah terjadi pergantian auditor yang menyebabkan hubun-
gan auditor dengan klien terputus, padahal secara substantif hubungan auditor-klien 
masih tetap berlangsung. Secara formal, auditor tidak melanggar aturan dan masih 
dapat memeriksa klien yang sama, namun jangka panjang, diduga dapat mempenga-
ruhi kualitas audit. Semakin panjang tenur auditor, diduga hubungan auditor-klien 
semakin dekat, sehingga auditor mengakomodasi kepentingan klien atas laporan
keuangan klien, termasuk praktik akrual diskresioner sebagai proksi kualitas audit.
Sampel dipilih dengan metode purposive sampling dari perusahaan yang terdaftar di
Bursa Efek Indonesia dari tahun 2002-2010, dengan pendekatan regresi linier ber-
ganda. Hasil uji statistik menunjukkan bahwa tenur, dan total aset tidak mempenga-
ruhi kualitas audit. Sedangkan ukuran KAP, dan utang berpengaruh signifikan secara
statistik terhadap kualitas audit. Penelitian ini diharapkan dapat memberikan kontri-
busi yang berkaitan dengan pengaturan rotasi auditor. Penelitian selanjutnya dapat 
memperpanjang perioda pengamatan, dan menggunakan ukuran kualitas audit lain-
nya, misalnya fraud, dan kecenderungan pemberian opini going concern.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Not many empirical studies uncover the effect of 
auditor tenure in artificial rotation on audit quality. 
However, the auditor should be aware of various 
things affecting their attitudes and thus slowly but 
surely erode their independence (Mautz and Sharaf 
1961). The longer the auditor-client relationship, 
concerns have been in over familiarity. Therefore, it 
will be more dangerous when the auditor accom-
modates the client on the client's financial state-
* Corresponding author, email address: 1 masjoen@uty.ac.id, 3 nurdiono_pb@yahoo.com, 4 e.suwardi@ugm.ac.id. 
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ments, including the practice of discretionary ac-
cruals. 
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
issued a regulation by the finance ministry in KMK 
423/KMK.06/2002 which was amended by the 
KMK 359/KMK.06/2003. In this rule stated that the 
the provision of public services for the client's fi-
nancial statements conducted by audit firm for the 
longest five consecutive years and by a maximum 
of partners for three consecutive years. Further-
more, the regulation renewed through PMK 
17/PMK.01/2008. The regulation states that the the 
provision of services of general audit of financial 
statements conducted by the auditor longest for 6 
consecutive years, and the oldest partner for 3 con-
secutive years. This regulation was issued by the 
government for the purpose of maintaining audit 
quality. 
Despite five years, audit firm can still be run 
on a client assignment, with no breaking the rules 
of the finance minister. This is done by the audit 
firm to change the name during the first assign-
ment. Therefore, they can continue during the next 
assignment. Formally, the audit firm does not vio-
late the rules and still be able to run on a client as-
signment. Although formally in the assignment 
period has been a change of audit firm with their 
rotation, substantively the relationship between 
client-audit firms was maintained. This phenome-
non indicates artificial rotation. Rotation artificially 
was done by simply changing the name of audit 
firm. Although an audit firm rotation has made 
appropriate government regulation, but the audit 
firm just renamed, or is affiliated with a foreign 
firm audit the same, so that substantially no rota-
tion occurs. Therefore, the rotation is only to abort 
an obligation, and not as to maintain audit quality. 
This study aimed to examine the effect of audi-
tor tenure on artificial rotation on audit quality. 
Although previous research has artifacts that un-
cover the effect of tenure on audit quality, they did 
not consider the phenomenon of artificial rotation 
in Indonesia. The phenomenon of artificial rotation 
suggests that the auditor essentially do not want to 
lose clients, because it will have an impact on in-
come audit firm. In this study, the term audit firm 
shows the auditor, and the two terms will be used 
interchangeably. Auditor tenure shows the auditor-
client relationships are measured in years (Geiger 
and Raghunandan 2002, Myers et al. 2003, Mansi et 
al. 2004, Ghosh and Moon 2005). Although there 
have been clear rules on auditor rotation, but the 
auditor can audit the same client, although the limit 
auditor-client engagement period had expired. 
 Audit quality is important for users of finan-
cial statements because it has a role in providing 
assurance on financial performance and account-
ability. Audit quality is the probability that the fi-
nancial statements contain material errors and 
auditors will find and report errors such material 
(DeAngelo 1981b). Causes of poor quality audit can 
not be separated from the bad auditor independ-
ence decline. Statement on Auditing Standards 1 
states that in all matters relating to the engagement, 
independence in mental attitude must be main-
tained by the auditor (IAPI 2010). The independ-
ence has reduced as it is suspected as the cause of 
the poor quality of audited financial statements. 
Long-term relationship between the auditor-
clients can reduce the independence of auditors. If 
the two parties engage intensively, feared auditors 
will decrease the level of independence. Auditors 
should have been able to detect the cause of the 
poor quality of financial reporting, the auditor will 
but it will seek to secure the practice, because there 
is a very close relationship with the client. There-
fore, the rotation of audit is expected to maintain 
audit quality by limiting the tenure of the auditor-
client. 
There are inconsistencies in the results of pre-
vious research on the effect of tenure on discretion-
ary accruals. For example, Davis, Soo, and Trom-
peter (2009) found that a long tenure positively and 
negatively related to audit quality. Mansi, Maxwell, 
and Miller (2004) found a significant negative rela-
tionship between tenure with the cost of corporate 
bond. Chen, Lin, and Lin (2005) use the perform-
ance-adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings quality; they found that the absolute value 
and positive discretionary accruals decreased sig-
nificantly with the audit partner tenure. After con-
trolling for tenure, they found that the absolute 
discretionary accruals decreased significantly with 
auditor tenure. Al-Thuneibat et al. (2011) found 
that the auditor tenure negatively affect audit qual-
ity, where the length of tenure, the higher the mag-
nitude of discretionary accruals. Carey and Simnett 
(2006) states that there is no significant relationship 
between audit partner tenure with discretionary 
accruals. Junaidi et al. (2012) showed that there is a 
negative effect of tenure on audit quality as meas-
ured by the propensity of the auditor issued a go-
ing concern opinion. 
Myers et al. (2003), Ghosh and Moon (2005) 
and Meutia (2004) explain different results of re-
search Carey and Simnett (2006), Davis et al. (2009), 
Chen et al. (2005) and Al-Thuneibat et al. (2011). 
Myers et al. (2003) conducted a similar study, and 
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showed the longer tenure auditor then the higher 
earnings quality. Ghosh and Moon (2005) research 
results indicate that the audited financial state-
ments, particularly the earnings report, it is ac-
countable for longer auditor tenure. Meutia (2004) 
result explains that the auditor tenure will reduce 
the level of earnings management. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND HYPO-
THESIS 
Audit Firm Tenure 
Tenure as a term of the auditor-client relationship is 
the length of the contract auditors working in the 
same client. The Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia issued a regulation by the finance minis-
try in KMK 423/KMK.06/2002 which was 
amended by KMK359/KMK.06/2003, which was 
renewed again through PMK 17/PMK.01/2008 on 
audit firm noted that the the provision of audit 
services common to the financial statements of an 
entity carried out by audit firm a maximum of six 
consecutive years, and by a partner at the latest 
three financial years consecutive. Audit firm and 
the partner can receive public audit services, after 
one year did not audit the client. 
The longer the auditor is assigned by the client 
relationship, as it may affect the level of auditor 
independence. Longer auditor tenure is very likely 
to be associated with reduced alertness auditors 
through overfamiliarity with clients (Mautz and 
Sharaf 1961). In addition, long auditor tenure can 
create economic incentives for becoming less inde-
pendent auditors, in this case that the auditor may 
agree to the demands of clients in order to continue 
to secure the future of audit fees (Hoyle 1978). The 
longer the auditor-client relationship will lead to 
dependency between the two sides. Auditor de-
pends on the client that has been a source of in-
come. For that reason, when it does not give an 
opinion in accordance with the wishes of the client, 
then the client is feared will move to other auditors. 
In a report issued by the SEC (Section Executive 
Committee) in 1992, mentioned several arguments 
regarding the auditor tenure. This argument states 
that the long-term relationship between the audi-
tor-client will cause problems as follows. 
1. The closeness of the relationship between the 
auditor-client creates a feeling of empathy with 
the client, thus causing doubts in the auditor's 
opinion on the issue giving the client and the 
auditor will lose professional skepticism. 
2. The auditor looked examination of the client as 
a repetition of a previous relationship that has 
existed with the same client. This will cause the 
auditor to anticipate the results, rather than 
evaluating the important changes that exist on 
the client. 
3. The auditor is to maintain a relationship that has 
been established with the client, and to priori-
tize the wishes of the client, rather than follow-
ing the existing professional standards. 
When the auditor-client relationship has taken 
place for years, the client can be seen as an ongoing 
source of revenue that could potentially reduce the 
independence of auditors. In this case, Sinason et 
al. (2001) argue that the auditor conducting an au-
dit assignment by the client, where the assignment 
of more than three consecutive years, the auditor is 
more at risk of losing its independence compared to 
the auditors who carry out audits of less than three 
years. Long tenure between client-auditor can affect 
the independence of the auditor. 
 
Independence 
Independence is the attitude of someone who is 
characterized by integrity and objectivity profes-
sional duties. According to the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), inde-
pendence is an ability to act based on the integrity 
and objectivity. Although integrity and objectivity 
can not be measured with certainty, they are fun-
damental for the public accountant profession. 
The independence (IAPI 2010) is not easily in-
fluenced, because the auditor implements it in pub-
lic interest (differentiated in terms of practice as an 
auditor internal auditor). Therefore, the auditor is 
not justified as favor of the interests of anyone, be-
cause however perfect the technical expertise that 
auditors have, the auditor will lose impartiality, 
which was very important for his opinion. 
The independence is related to the ability to act 
objectively and with integrity. This can only be 
done by a person who psychologically has high 
intellectual honesty. Therefore, independence is a 
state of mind. This assessment may be limited to 
appearance, the way and the work undertaken by 
public accountants, as it looks from the outside is 
apperance. So that for practical purposes a public 
accountant must be free from relationships that 
have the potential to cause bias in giving opinions. 
Audit quality depends on the public's perception of 
auditor independence owned. The independence of 
the audit means taking an unbiased viewpoint in 
the audit test, evaluation results of the audit and 
audit reporting. 
Many factors can affect the independence of 
the auditor. According Barizah et al. (2005), there 
are at least six factors influence the auditor's inde-
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pendence. These factors are as follows. 
1. The size of the audit firm size, DeAngelo (1981b) 
found a positive relationship between the size of 
the audit firm with auditor independence. This 
means that the bigger the size of the audit firm, 
the higher its independence. 
2. The level of competition among audit firms in 
providing services to clients, namely the hope 
would like to serve clients with both the inde-
pendence will decline. 
3. Tenure affects the independence, because the 
longer the auditor independence level will de-
crease. 
4. The cost of audit services, the fees received by 
the firm if the greater the level of independence 
will decrease. 
5. Managerial consulting services, independence is 
negatively affected by additional services such 
managerial suggestions given by an auditor to 
audit clients. 
6. The existence of an audit committee at the client 
company, a lot of support which suggested the 
existence of a positive relationship between the 
audit committee independence. 
 
Audit Quality 
DeAngelo (1981) defines an audit quality as the 
probability that the auditor discovered and re-
ported on the existence of a breach in the client 
accounting system. The probability of finding an 
infringement depends on the technical capabilities 
of the auditor and the auditor's independence. Au-
dit quality is the probability that the auditor will 
report to the audit report for the unqualified finan-
cial statements contain material misstatements (Lee 
et al. 1999). Audit quality is determined by the abil-
ity of the audit to reduce noise and bias and in-
crease the purity of accounting data (Wallace 1980 
in Watkins et al. 2004). 
Coram et al. (2008) stated that audit quality is 
what the odds of auditors find any unintentional 
or intentional error of the company's financial 
statements, as well as how likely these findings 
are reported and included in the audit opinion. 
Audit quality depends on the ability of auditors 
are represented in technical and professional edu-
cation experience, and auditor independence in 
maintaining mental attitude. Furthermore, 
Peecher and Piercey (2008) state audit quality as 
the probability of an auditor discovered and re-
ported violations in the client accounting system. 
The probability of finding an infringement de-
pends on the technical capabilities of the auditor 
and the auditor's independence. 
Audit Quality Measurement 
Research on audit quality has been in short time so 
that a lot of research that applies some calculation 
methods of audit quality measurements uses AB-
DAC value. Calculation of ABDAC consists of sev-
eral ways of calculation used. According to re-
search conducted by Matis (2010) calculations on 
ABDAC there are a variety of ways. The calculation 
of this ABDAC obtained based on the Model Jones 
(1991) with the following steps. 
ACCRit =ΔCAit - ΔCLit - ΔCashit + ΔSTDEBTit + 
DEPTNit  (1) 
Notation: 
ACCRit = total accruals for firm i period t 
ΔCAit =  change in current assets of firm i during 
period t 
ΔCLit = change in current liabilities during period t 
firm i 
ΔCashit = change in cash and cash equivalents dur-
ing period t firm i 
ΔSTDEBTit = change in the balance of the com-
pany's long-term obligations that have matured i in 
period t. 
ΔDEPTNit = depreciation and amortization expense 
for firm i period t. 
Further use is to seek total accruals is as fol-
lows. 
ACCRit = EBXTit - CFOit  (2) 
Notation: 
EBXTit = earnings before extraordinary items, dis-
continued operations for the period t. 
FOit =  operating cash flow for period t firm i 
Further, according to Siregar and Utama 
(2006), to decompose total accruals into discretion-
ary and non discretionary component then there 
are a variety of ways: 1. It uses the Jones Model 
(1991); 2. Using the Model Dechow (1995); 3. It uses 
the Model Kasznik (1999); 4. Using the Model 
Dechow (2002). These models will be discussed as 
follows: 
1. Model of Jones (1991) 
This model was first developed by Jones who used 
to decompose total accruals with the following 
models: 
ACCRit = β1 + β2∆REVit + β3PPEit + E (3) 
Notation: 
ACCRit = total accruals for firm i period t 
ΔREVi = change in revenue for the company i for 
year t. 
PPEit = fixed assets of the company in period t 
2. Model of Dechow (1995) 
Dechow (1995) include ΔRECit which is a change in 
receivables for firm i for year t, ΔRECit it used to be 
a deduction from ΔREVit, so that the model is as 
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follows. 
ACCRit = β1 + β2(∆REVit - ∆RECit) + β3PPEit + E (4) 
3. Model of Kasznik (1999) 
Model Kasznik (1999) include ΔCFOit which is a 
change in cash flow from operating activities for 
firm i for year t. So that the model is as follows. 
ACCRit = β1 + β2(∆REVit - ∆RECit) + β3PPEit + 
β4∆CFOit + E (5) 
4. Model of Dechow (2002) 
Dechow (2002) modify the model to decompose 
total accruals as follows. 
ACCRit = β1 + β2(∆REVit – (1-k) ∆RECit) + β3PPEit + 
β4ACCRit-1 + β5∆REVit-1+ E (6) 
Notation: 
K = slope of the regression coefficient of ΔREVit 
ΔRECit 
ACCRit-1 = t-1 total accruals divided by total assets 
t-2 
ΔREVit-1 = Change in revenue from year t to t+1, 
with revenues in year t ((REVt +1 - REVt)/REVt). 
The variables in the model are divided by total 
assets in period t-1. After the decomposition of total 
accruals, the DAC (discretionary accrual) is esti-
mated as follows: 
DACit = ACCRit/ TAi,t-1 –NDAit (7) 
This study uses a model approach from 
Kasznik. The Kasznik model is a modification of 
the Jones model that is considered better because it 
has a higher adjusted R2 values than other models 
of computation. 
 
Hypothesis 
Davis et al. (2009) studied the relationship between 
the length of auditor tenure and earnings manage-
ment level. Specifically, they conducted a study 
between duration and magnitude ABDAC auditor 
tenure and forecast. Forecast error is defined as 
actual earnings minus analyst forecast earnings. 
The results of this study indicate a positive rela-
tionship between auditor tenure and ABDAC. 
While the relationship auditor tenure and forecast 
error is negative which means that the longer audi-
tor tenure is smaller forecast error? This suggests 
that firms are increasingly able to meet earnings 
forecasts that have been determined. 
Johnson et al. (2002) tested the tenure with the 
quality of financial reporting. Their study used two 
variables proxy for the quality of financial reports 
and a sample that uses the big-six audit firm. The 
results of this study found a significant relationship 
to the length of tenure of four to eight years, and 
the long tenure of two to three years related to the 
low quality of reporting. They found no evidence 
that reducing the quality of financial reporting for 
more than nine years of tenure. 
Myers et al. (2003) examined the relationship 
between auditor tenure and earnings quality that is 
represented by ABDAC. Myers et al. (2003) found 
that the longer auditor tenure, the quality of higher 
earnings. Gosh and Moon (2005) examine whether 
auditor tenure and audit quality or affect the per-
ception of audit quality. Researchers used two 
measures as a proxy for the quality of the first au-
dit, quality audit through accrual accounting. The 
second measure for audit quality is the investor's 
perception of audit quality as represented by the 
earnings response coeffecient (ERC). The results 
showed decreased levels of discretionary accruals 
as auditor tenure increases. Test results on investor 
perceptions also show results where the investor 
perception of audit quality, the better, with increas-
ing auditor tenure. Collectively, it can be concluded 
that it leads to better audit quality by increasing 
auditor tenure. 
Meutia (2004) tested the effects of auditor in-
dependence on the relationship between audit 
quality and earnings management. Independence is 
measured by the non audit services and auditor 
tenure. The sample consisted of 131 companies list-
ing on the Indonesia Stock Exchange the period 
1998 to 2001. It uses measure of the quality audit is 
the auditor size as a proxy. Beside, the correlation 
analysis is used to examine the relationship be-
tween audit quality and ABDAC, and auditor in-
dependence variable is moderating variables. It 
showed a negative relationship between audit qual-
ity and ABDAC. 
When related to the size of the independence, 
researchers conducted tests use independent t-test 
to see if there is a difference between the level of 
discretionary accruals before and after three years. 
Test results showed that non-audit services in-
creases the value ABDAC, and auditor tenure low-
ers the value ABDAC. 
H0: Audit firm tenure does not significantly affect 
the audit quality. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Population and Sample 
The population in this study is a company listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2010. 
The sample was selected by purposive sampling 
method. The criteria used to select the sample are 
as follows: 
1. The financial industry including insurance was 
not chosen because it has a specific form of finan-
cial statements and different from other industries. 
Different financial statements require special meth-
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ods in the calculation of discretionary accrual. 
2. The financial statements of the company chosen 
is a report that has a full accrual information for the 
years in which the same audit firm that is still used. 
3. The financial statements have selected is substan-
tively reports audited by the same auditor least six 
consecutive years. 
 
Operational Definition 
Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable is audit quality as measured by 
ABDAC with Kasznik model approach. Kasznik 
model is a modification of the Jones model has an 
adjusted R2 is higher than the other model calcula-
tions. Therefore, this model so it is considered bet-
ter than other calculation models, with the follow-
ing stages. 
1. Calculate the total accrual 
In the financial statements, the accrual basis is used 
to prepare the balance sheet and income statement, 
while the cash flow statement prepared using the 
cash basis. On the basis that there are two things in 
computing the total income accrued and the bal-
ance sheet approach to cash flow approach. Total 
balance sheet approach is the calculation of accruals 
under the assumption of changes in working capi-
tal accounts in the balance sheet, with the accrual 
component is applied to the revenue and expense 
accounts on the income statement in accordance 
with equation 1. Then, it looks for ACCRit (Tottal 
Accrual) according to equation 2. 
2. Measurement of descretionary accrual (DAC) 
and non descretionary accrual (NDA) 
Jones model as modified by Kasznik can separate 
total accruals into non discretionary (NDA) and 
discretionary accruals (DAC). Jones Model is in-
tended to calculate the expected accrual occurs 
along with the change in the company's operational 
activities (NDA). The difference between total ac-
cruals and NDA is the absolute value of DAC 
which is a proxy of audit quality. 
The first thing required to be able to calculate 
the NDA is seeking coefficient β1, β2, and β3 by us-
ing equation 5. All variables are divided by total 
assets of the previous year, then the equation be-
comes as follows. 
ACCRit/Tai,t-1= β1(1/Tai,t-1) + β2(∆REVit -∆RECit) / 
TAi,t-1 + β3(PPEit) / TAi,t-1 + β4(∆CFOit)/TAi,t-1 + E (8) 
Notation: 
ACCRit/Tai, t-1 = total accruals for firm i at end of 
year t 
Tai, t-1 = total assets for firm i at end of year t-1 
ΔREVi/Tai, t-1 = change in revenue for the company i 
for year t, divided by total assets for firms i at the 
end of year t-1 
ΔRECit Tai, t-1 = change in receivables for firm i for 
year t, divided by total assets for firm i at end of 
year t-1 
ΔCFOit Tai, t-1 = change in cash flow from operating 
activities for firm i for year t, divided by total assets 
for firms i at the end of year t-1 
PPEit Tai, t-1 = fixed assets firm i in period t divided 
by total assets of firm i in period t-1. 
The next coefficient obtained from regression 
equations is included in the following equation to 
get the NDA it: 
NDAit =β1(1/Tai,t-1) + β2(∆REVit-∆RECit)/TAi,t-1 + 
β3(PPEit) / TAi,t-1 + β4(∆CFOit)/TAi,t-1 + E (9) 
Furthermore, DAC can be estimated according 
to equation 7 and then look for the absolute num-
bers of DAC, which can be found ABDAC. 
 
Independent Variable 
In this study, the independent variable is tenure. 
Tenure is calculated using the number of years the 
company has ties to the same audit firm. 
 
The Control Variables 
Assets 
We control the size of the client using the natural 
log of total assets to eliminate the effect of firm size 
because large firms are shown to have accrued a 
larger and more stable (Dechow and Dichev 2002, 
Al-Thuneaibat et al. 2010). 
Debt 
DEBT variables were included because based on 
the debt covenant hypotheses predict that manag-
ers want to increase profits and assets to reduce 
debt contract renegotiation costs when a company 
decides its debt agreements. Unlike existing inves-
tors, creditors do not have a mechanism to increase 
their profits. However, creditors are protected by a 
conservative accounting standard that further in-
creases if the ratio of debt the company will likely 
try to improve the procedure reported earnings. 
DER=
TotalAsset
lityTotalLiabi  (10) 
 
Audtype 
This variable is a dummy variable that auditors 
affiliated with the Big Four auditors (Delloite, Ernst 
& Young, KPMG, Pricewaterhorsecoopers) given 
the value of 1, and is not affiliated with the big four 
are given a value of 0. DeAngelo (1981) states that 
the auditors are included big eight have higher 
audit quality. Therefore, the auditor size is often 
used as a proxy of some previous studies on audit 
quality. 
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This is not surprising because it has a big four 
auditor competence of human resources, facilities, 
and experience which allows providing a higher 
quality than non big four. Meutia (2004) con-
cluded that the clients of the big four audit firm 
has ABDAC low levels, while clients of non big 
four will have a high level of ABDAC. Meutia 
(2004) concluded that the relationship between 
audit qualities by ABDAC is negative. This means 
that the higher the quality of the audit, the lower 
the level ABDAC. 
 
Model 
Regression model used in this study is as follows: 
ABDAC = α + β1tenure + β2audtype + β3assets + β4debt 
+ e (11) 
Statistical tests are used to test the hypotheses 
is multiple linear regression analysis with 95% 
confidence level. In testing the regression model 
will be presented in descriptive statistics, classical 
assumption test and F test and t test. The influence 
of independent variables on the dependent vari-
able is of 95% confidence level. The criteria for the 
decision to reject the null hypothesis are to look at 
p-value. If the p-value is less than 0.05, H0 is re-
jected. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Sample Description 
With purposive sampling, 61 samples were ob-
tained by the number of companies that is 485 firms 
in the year observations with the number as seen in 
Table 1. The sample can also be classified based on 
each of manufacturers as as seen in Table 2. 
As presented on the type of manufacturing 
(Table 2), it can be concluded that the majority of 
the sample firms are from the basic industries and 
chemicals. The percentage of companies included 
in the industry amounted to 33% of the total 61 
companies, while the processing of agricultural 
products 13%, 8% processing mining, heavy indus-
try 28%, and the food industry by 18%. 
As seen on Table 3, it can be concluded that the 
largest percentage of the sample firms is 49% have 
tenure for 9 consecutive years, 6 consecutive years 
by 15%, 7 consecutive years by 25%, and 8 consecu-
tive years by 11 %. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
As on Table 4, there are 485 observations for all 
variables of independent, dependent or control. For 
ABDAC variable has a maximum value 2.3505 and 
0.0006 with a minimum average value of 0.356084 
and a standard deviation of 0.4485970 and has a 
value of 0.201 variants. Tenure variable has a 
maximum value of 9 and 1 with a minimum aver-
age value of 4.56 and a standard deviation of 2.413 
and 5.821 have the variant. The assets variable has a 
maximum value of 31.4870 and 13.0712 with a 
minimum average value and standard deviation 
23.857961 4.9254851 and has a value of 24 260 vari-
ants. DEBT variable has a maximum value of 5.1512 
and 0.0065 with a minimum average value of 
0.621323 and a standard deviation of 0.4460235 and 
has a variance value of 0.199. 
 
Classical Assumptions Testing 
Test results show that the classical assumption of 
the model satisfy the classical assumptions. The 
results of the correlation between variables did not 
seem correlations among the independent variables 
with the highest level of correlation between vari-
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Description Amount 
The number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange  424 
Companies that do not include manufacturing (289) 
Companies that did not complete its financial statement (74) 
Samples with tenure ≥ 6 years 61 
 
Table 2 
Sample Distribution by Type of Manufacturing 
The Manufacturing Total Percent 
Processing agricultural output 8 13% 
Mining processing 5 8% 
Basic industry and chemical 20 33% 
Heavy industry 17 28% 
The food industry 11 18% 
Amount 61 100% 
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ables is 0.155405 which is between the audtype 
variables with the assets variable, where the value 
0.155405 is still far below 0.95. VIF calculation re-
sults also show the same thing no one independent 
variable that has a VIF value greater than 10. There-
fore, there is no multicollinearity between the inde-
pendent variables in the regression model of this 
study. 
 
Hypothesis Testing Results 
Statistical test showed the value of Adjusted R 
square of 0.133 which means that 13.3% of the 
variation ABDAC is explained by tenure, assets, 
DER, audtype and 86.7% is explained by other 
variables outside the model. The statistical test per-
formed to determine the effect of independent vari-
ables individually against the dependent variable, 
as shown in table 5 as follows. 
Table 5 shows the tenure has a significant 
value of 0.933 greater than α 0.05. Therefore, the 
tenure is not significantly effect to ABDAC, the null 
hypothesis can not be rejected. These results 
showed no effect between audit firm tenure with 
audit quality, and this study is consistent with re-
search conducted by Carey and Simnett (2006) and 
is consistent with research conducted by Myers et 
al. (2003), Gosh and Moon (2005 ), Meutia (2004), 
Davis et al. (2009), Johnson et al. (2002). Further-
more, to control variables show that debt and aud-
type have significantly effect to ABDAC with a 
significance value of 0.000 respectively, the assets is 
not significantly ABDAC with a significance value 
of 0.56. 
For the debt variable, it is consistent with re-
search conducted by Siregar and Utama (2006), so 
that the results of this study support the debt 
covenant hypothesis where company tend to re-
cord the accrual of a greater to qualify of debt. 
Further to audtype variable, consistent with re-
search conducted by Davis et al. (2009), Gosh and 
Moon (2005), Myers, et al. (2003), where the audit 
firm size has a significantly negative correlation to 
the level ABDAC. Therefore, companies audited 
by large audit firms tend to have a lower level 
ABDAC. In contrast, the assets have no effect on 
the level ABDAC. These results are consistent 
with research conducted by Martani and Wijaya 
(2011). 
Table 3 
Sample Distribution by Tenure 
Tenure  Total  Percent 
6 consecutive years 9 15% 
7 consecutive years 15 25% 
8 consecutive years 7 11% 
9 consecutive years 30 49% 
Amount 61 100% 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
ABDAC 485 0.0006 2.3505 0.3561 0.4486 0.201 
Tenure 485 1 9 4.5600 2.4130 5.821 
Assets 485 13.0712 31.487 23.8580 4.9255 24.26 
Debt 485 0.0065 5.1512 0.6213 0.4460 0.199 
Audtype 485 0 1 0.8000 0.4040 0.163 
Valid N  485      
 
Table 5 
Statistical Testing Result 
Unstd. Coefficients Std. Coefficients 95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
Model 
B Std. Error Beta 
T Sig. 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.417 .115  3.619 .000 .190 .643 
.001 .008 .004 .084 .933 -.015 .016 
-.002 .004 -.025 -.584 .560 -.010 .005 
.288 .044 .283 6.546 .000 .202 .375 
1 
(Constant) 
Tenure 
Assets 
Debt 
Audtype -.235 .048 -.211 -4.848 .000 -.330 -.139 
a. Dependent Variable: ABDAC 
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5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATION 
The closeness of the relationship between the audi-
tors and the client in the long run should be a con-
cern, especially for regulators. In addition, auditors 
are required to maintain its independence for audit 
quality is maintained. The rules on auditor rotation 
should reflect that at some point the relationship 
between auditor-client can truly reflect the actual 
rotation, not an artificial rotation. 
The length of the relationship between auditor-
client can reduce the independence of the auditor. 
If the two parties in dealing intensively which may 
cause some effects that lead to each other, know 
each other and with this it is feared will decrease 
the level of auditor independence. Auditor should 
detect the cause of the poor quality of financial re-
porting, but the auditor will only seek to secure the 
practice because it is known familiarly and good 
friends. 
For that reason, the rotation of the audit is ex-
pected to maintain audit quality by limiting the 
tenure of the auditor by the client. Audit quality is 
shown by the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
included in the audited financial statements. Statis-
tical test results showed that the significant level of 
0.933 greater than 0.05. This study is not enough 
statistically evidence to reject H0. Therefore, the 
results of this study indicate that tenure is not sta-
tistically effect to audit quality. 
This study examines the audit quality as 
measured by the level of discretionary accruals, 
although there are still many other audit quality 
measures, for example relating to litigation, going 
concern opinion. In addition, the use of secondary 
data in this study was found to have limitations in 
the period of observation and the limited amount 
of data. For the next research, it can relate phenom-
ena artificially rotation to other audit quality, for 
example fraud and the propensity of auditor to 
issue a going concern opinion. 
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